Friday, February 5, 2010

Afia too Abroo-e-Ummat -e- Marhoom Hai

Looking at her house from outside the feeling has always been much of shame and agony ..a banner placed at the watchman 's tent outside the quite and big house says ..


Qaum ki beti Afia ko riha karo ..[Release the Daughter of the nation]



where people outside the very house are busy in their own lives , some singing the songs of democracy [ or DEMOCRAZY as i would like to call it ] while others are staunchly busy in alligning themselves as moderates who continue to distance themselves from any Afia owing to the reason that it will either get them in danger or will expose their faiths in real.


we are living in a mad world today ...the killer is the innocent and the innocent is the alleged killer here.

Asmat Siddiqui would have never in her wildest dreams thought of her daughter being kidnappedand sent to Bagram air base for no reason.. she wouldnt have known that in order to be eligible for being the AL QAEDA lady ..her daughter only has to openly talk about her faith, live a normal life and practice her faith giving no harm to any one around her. Afia is not a woman who is held for no crime , the fanatic jury members admit that the forensice evidence is missing from the Gun that she is alleged to have used against the american soldiers , also her reported location at that time is of enough doubt considering the reporting of her kidnapping by US intelligence agencies from Karachi..this verdict only reflects the audacity to lie and establish that as a fact ..she is an image that will be useful for the zionist and the real extremists for the years to come to haunt the other AFIAs all over the world. we may be modern in our attire just like Dr. Mahwish whose residence in Naval Complex and a brother in the armed forces doesnt deter them from their task. The aim is simple and straight , instill fear ..and fear of the kind that not only you will be taken out but your family will suffer too , your childern will be homeless and your lives will change forever

whats even more surprising is the rather blunt strategy in use..considering the profile of Afia who was friendly with all be it any race , color or religion , a highly educated woman and a graduate from one of the top universities of the world , and humble in all her relationships. she was not a target by any means and that made her the perfect target for a crusade mission of its own kind.

its ironic how ever that in a country where O J simpson gets away with his murder crimes and and where in some states lawlessness takes the guise of CULTURAL and society norms , jury giving a verdict of the most horrific kind is no wonder indeed.After all it was never about justice in the first place.This war is not only psychological but also driven by faith ..

Afia or no Afia ...Islam will rule the world anyway insha'ALLAH , however Afia Siddiqui's name will be written in the books of history as the lady who symbolized faith in ONENESS of ALLAH ,istiqamaah and strength of character..and this will give rise to more and more Afias to come..A momin or a mominah for that matter can never be defied thru fear or injustice only.

 
Today as homage to this brave and courageous woman we solute Afia Siddiqui for giving us hope of a new dawn ..insha'ALLAH ..we are with you sister every single sec that u suffer at the hands of these evil butchers and monsters who continue to make you go thru hell..but ALLAH has best plans and the tides will turn indeed insha'ALLAH..ameen

Afghan Mujahideen : NOT FOR SALE

Kabul’s Western allies want to pay Taliban fighters to quit the insurgency. Lots of luck.
Ron Moreau
Representatives from nearly 70 countries showed up in London on Jan. 28 for a one-day conference on how to save Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai was there, gamely offering “peace and reconciliation” to all Afghans, “especially” those “who are not a part of Al Qaeda or other terrorist networks.” He didn’t mention why the Taliban would accept such an offer while they believe they’re winning the war. Others at the conference had what they evidently considered more realistic solutions—such as paying Taliban fighters to quit the insurgency. Participants reportedly pledged some $500 million to support that aim. “You don’t make peace with your friends,” said U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. True enough. But what if your enemies don’t want peace?
My NEWSWEEK colleague Sami Yousafzai laughs at the notion that the Taliban can be bought or bribed. Few journalists, officials, or analysts know the Taliban the way he does. If the leadership, commanders, and subcommanders wanted comfortable lives, he says, they would have made their deals long ago. Instead they stayed committed to their cause even when they were on the run, with barely a hope of survival. Now they’re back in action across much of the south, east, and west, the provinces surrounding Kabul, and chunks of the north. They used to hope they might reach this point in 15 or 20 years. They’ve done it in eight. Many of them see this as proof that God is indeed on their side. The mujahedin warlords who regained power in the 2001 U.S. invasion have grown fabulously wealthy since then. The senior Taliban leader Jalaluddin Haqqani could have done the same. Now he and his fellow Taliban are gunning for those opportunists.
Only a few relatively low-level Taliban commanders and fighters have defected, and they rue the day they did. Most of them now live hand-to-mouth in Kabul, exiled from their home villages. Sami has introduced me to some of them. They only wish they could return to the embrace of Haqqani or Mullah Baradar, the Taliban’s No. 2 leader after Mullah Mohammed Omar, but they know they’d be killed if they were foolish enough to try. The Taliban don’t give second chances. Even if Karzai and his U.S.-NATO allies offer great gobs of money to defecting Taliban, where could they go with it? They couldn’t go home for fear of being put to death by their former comrades in arms. They wouldn’t want to live in expensive Kabul, where people on the streets would make fun of their country ways, huge black turbans, and kohl eyeliner. They hate everything that Kabul represents: a sinful place of coed schools, dancing, drinking, music, movies, prostitution, and the accumulation of wealth. “Falcons fly with falcons, not with other birds,” the Taliban say. In other words, you can’t negotiate and live with secular people.
Karzai and his regime have practically no credibility anyway. No one trusts his promises, and they regard his government as an evil thing, a heretical, apostate regime. More than that, however, Taliban tend to take offense at the very idea of a buyout. As one fighter told Sami indignantly, “You can’t buy my ideology, my religion. It’s an insult.” In terms of defection, the closest thing to a “success” story is the former Taliban commander Mullah Salam. He quit the insurgency two years ago, was allowed to keep most of his men and weapons, and was given the governorship of his home district of Musa Qala, in Helmand province. Nevertheless he lives under constant threat of assassination, and Musa Qala remains a very insecure place.
Most Taliban feel comfortable only in the backcountry villages, where their world view is essentially shared by locals. There’s a huge and growing disconnect—social, economic, and perhaps even spiritual—between the cities and the countryside. In villages where the Taliban have a strong presence, there is little or no conflict between Taliban virtues and local customs, from the wearing of long beards to heeding the call for prayer, keeping the sexes separate in public, adhering to Islamic law, and not tolerating crime. Especially in the countryside, most ordinary Pashtuns regard themselves as the big losers in the past eight years of Karzai’s rule and foreign military presence. As they see it, accurately or not, their ethnic rivals—the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazara—have received the spoils of the Taliban’s defeat, while Pashtun villages have suffered from official abuse, corruption, neglect, and war.

That’s one reason the Taliban aren’t as unpopular in the villages as Western-funded polls appear to indicate. Unlike the Karzai government, they have proved their ability to deliver swift Islamic justice and keep their villages free from crime. The respected Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid often says there has been no pro-Taliban uprising because most Afghans dislike the movement. On the other hand, though, few Pashtun villagers have mobilized against the insurgents. Perhaps most important, the Taliban’s leadership is confident of the movement’s cohesiveness. Although the insurgency lacks a single, unified command, its leaders all fight in the name of Mullah Omar and his defunct Islamic Emirate. “No one,” they say, “can fly just on his own wings.” The Quetta Shura, its Peshawar offshoot, the Haqqani network in the east, and individual commanders in the north—all different command structures led by different personalities—all derive their spiritual authority and political clout from the “commander of the faithful.” If their ranks remained unbroken through years of being hunted, jailed, killed, outgunned, outmanned, and outspent, they feel confident now that their leaders and lieutenants can’t be bought, as senior Taliban commander Mullah Nasir recently observed to Sami.
Most Taliban seem genuinely convinced that they are carrying out the will of God. One sign of that faith is the apparently endless supply of suicide bombers. The Americans still seem not to have grasped the full import of this. The Taliban are not fighting for a share of power; they want to restore Islamic law throughout the country, with no talk of compromise. They despise their nominal ally Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who has said that suicide bombings are not justified under Islam and who talks of possible power-sharing deals with Karzai. A “son of dollars,” they call him: someone who cannot be trusted, someone who does not share their goal of reimposing Sharia over all of Afghanistan.
Karzai is hopeless. He reads from a script he knows will please his Western patrons: new drives for good governance, transparency, narcotics suppression, the building of the Afghan security forces, economic development, etc. Nevertheless, for the past eight years he and his appointees have been incapable of delivering a fraction of what he has promised, and there’s no reason to think the next year or two will be any different. He’s a nice guy, is not corrupt, and doubtless means well. But he is not a leader or a judge of men, and he has no vision. He promises everything to everyone, as he did in the last election, but nothing comes of it. No one in his administration gets fired or jailed for egregious behavior. The harshest punishment for malfeasance is transfer to a perhaps less lucrative position.
The London conference was a futile exercise. Once again Washington and its allies are looking for solutions that don’t exist: a new Karzai, bribing the Taliban, negotiating with the Taliban. No Taliban leader of any stature seems to have entered into negotiations thus far. U.N. special envoy Kai Eide reportedly met in Dubai on Jan. 6 with Afghans who claimed to represent the Taliban and said they could pass messages to the Quetta Shura, but it’s unlikely that their mission was actually sanctioned by anyone in the senior leadership. (The U.N. says no such meeting took place.) The United Nations has made a big deal of removing the names of five supposed Taliban from its blacklist, but the Taliban couldn’t care less. They’re not itching to travel to Geneva or New York or open bank accounts. They’ve got a war to fight at home.

Source : www.pakistankakhudahafiz.wordpress.com